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Medicine and the Public:  
The 1962 Report of the Royal College 
of Physicians and the New Public Health
virginia berridge
summary: The 1962 report of the Royal College of Physicians on smoking was a 
significant event in the history of smoking. Its significance was, however, more than 
smoking-specific: the RCP committee’s appointment, its membership, its work, 
and the manner of its publication signified the changes within social medicine, 
and within the medical profession more generally, in postwar Britain. Doctors 
assumed the right to speak to the public and to government on matters of indi-
vidual health, and a new risk-based public health was in the process of formation. 
A public health “policy community” formed, and governments began to assume 
responsibility for advising the public on health matters. The use of research in the 
report, and of social research in response to it, was important in the emergence 
of evidence-based medicine within public health. The paper argues for greater 
attention to the change in public health epitomized by the report in current 
debates on the concept of the 1960s “permissive society.” It was the harbinger of 
a new style of “coercive permissiveness” in health.
keywords: smoking, public health, media, evidence-based medicine, social 
medicine, permissive society, consumerism
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In April 1963, D. Kelly wrote to the British Ministry of Health about an 
idea he had had in his head for quite a while about antismoking publicity. 
After discussion with a German doctor friend, he suggested: “A rhyming 
poster might work. . . . ‘THE MODERN BLOKE—DOESN’T SMOKE’. 
. . . The ladies are less of a problem—but a growing one. What about 
‘CONTEMPORARY HAGS ABHOR FAGS’ with a similar illustration of 
modern witches refusing temptation.”1 Another correspondent, K. Nor-
man Reynolds, had written in the previous month. He enclosed a poster 
he had originally designed for a competition, but was, “alas,” “too late in 
entering it”: “The word ‘Cancer’ is spelt in cork tipped cigarettes, which 
gets across a point as well as adding to the eye appeal. This unfortunately 
hasn’t come out in this print.”2 In the early 1960s, the Ministry was also 
the recipient of “puffing poems” and drawings, the results of a National 
Society of Non Smokers essay competition for children. Antismoking ideas 
poured in from members of the public.
These suggestions, now yellowing in their folders in the National 
Archives, are testimony to the change that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s 
in public health, and, indeed, in the relationship between medicine and 
society more generally. For the talk of posters and homemade publicity 
efforts represented the last gasp of an older tradition of public health 
and of public education, but also looked toward new developments. A 
new era of mass-media education and health consciousness of individual 
risk was dawning. Both David Armstrong and Mark Harrison have seen 
the war years as important for the rise of health education—either as 
Armstrong’s “medicine of the social”3 promoted by the wartime need to 
know, or Harrison’s argument that wartime health education in the army 
promoted a new mood of citizenship and responsibility.4 The late 1950s 
and early 1960s saw a reorientation of that wartime stance on the part of 
government: citizens who would act responsibly if given “the facts” were 
replaced by consumers of harmful goods or substances who needed to be 
persuaded about risk. In the early 1960s, medicine began to modernize 
itself, repositioning itself in relation to government, and to society and 
“the public.” I argue here that the report on smoking published by the 
Royal College of Physicians in 1962, Smoking and Health, was a key stage 
1. “Smoking and Lung Cancer: Publicity Suggestions,” Ministry of Health files, MH 
151/23, National Archives, Kew (hereafter NA).
2. Ibid.
3. David Armstrong, A New History of Identity: A Sociology of Medical Knowledge (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2002), p. 51.
4. Mark Harrison, Medicine and Victory: British Military Medicine in the Second World War 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 4.
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on the road to the new modernized and mediatized medicine and public 
health.
The repositioning and its implications are central to two areas of his-
torical debate—to reassessments of “the permissive society” of the 1960s, 
and to the historiography of public health. For the former, commentators 
such as the health-policy analyst Howard Glennerster have noted that a 
new social-policy agenda was emergent in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s, 
which removed criminal sanctions in regard to abortion and sexuality and 
was hostile to state intervention in such matters.5 But others have noted 
that criminal forms of regulation were replaced by medical ones, and that 
“permissiveness” in sexuality was dependent on new forms of medical sur-
veillance.6 The “myth” of 1960s permissiveness has come under scrutiny 
in a wider range of more recent work.7 The revision has not, however, 
discussed the changes in public health in that decade that are consid-
ered in this paper. I seek to argue that the 1962 report and the changes 
it helped to usher in in public health in the 1960s, and especially in the 
1970s, embodied the contradictions in the concept of permissiveness: on 
the one hand, health became a matter of individual responsibility; but 
that individual responsibility lay within a new framework of governmen-
tal intervention in individual behavior—what is termed here “coercive 
permissiveness.”
The historiography of British public health is beginning to take account 
of the postwar changes in the ideology and outlook of public health.8 
Most attention has been focused on the organizational and professional 
changes that saw the Medical Officer of Health (MOH) lose his local gov-
ernment “empire” in the early 1970s and reemerge as the “community 
physician” located within the National Health Service (NHS). Medical 
public health professionals have been criticized in Jane Lewis’s work for 
the failure to develop a distinctive ideology for public health, and for their 
tendency to define the role of public health around whatever tasks they 
undertook at the time.9 Journalist doctors like James Le Fanu and Michael 
5. Howard Glennerster, British Social Policy since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 96.
6. Jeffrey Weeks, Sex, Politics and Society: The Regulation of Sexuality since 1800 (London: 
Longman, 1981), pp. 267–68.
7. See, e.g., James Obelkevich, review of The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, 
Italy, and the United States, c1958–c1974 (1998) by Arthur Marwick, Twent. Cent. Brit. Hist., 
2000, 11 (3): 333–36.
8. The work of Dorothy Porter on social medicine and the organizational relationship 
with the social sciences is the main example: see Dorothy Porter, ed., Social Medicine and 
Medical Sociology in the Twentieth Century (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997).
9. Jane Lewis, What Price Community Medicine? The Philosophy, Practice and Politics of Public 
Health since 1919 (Brighton: Harvester, 1986), pp. 1–12.
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Fitzpatrick have discussed the subsequent history of public health. They 
have criticized the rise of a new “health tyranny” through health promo-
tion, but they have focused primarily on later events and key issues like 
the government health-education campaigns on AIDS in the 1980s.10
I argue in this paper that both sets of historical debates need to incor-
porate consideration of the 1962 Royal College report and the rise of an 
ethos of public health not tied to health services, to MOsH, or to com-
munity physicians. The 1962 report was highly significant for the history 
of smoking policy, but its significance was also a wider one. First, it signified 
a new willingness on the part of medicine to speak to the public, and to use the 
media to do so. The media became central to public health. Doctors reori-
ented their role so that they spoke to the public, not just to the rest of the 
profession. The role of the media also became central to debates within 
public health: on the one hand, mass-media campaigns were increasingly 
important as a strategy and began to focus on the role of individual risks 
to health, to urge the reformation of behavior; on the other, the control 
and even prohibition of advertising deemed detrimental to health was to 
become an important public health strategy. The wartime and immediate 
postwar emphasis on responsibility and citizenship gave way to an empha-
sis on propaganda and persuasion using consumerist techniques. Second, it 
marked the emergence of a “policy community” around public health, linking civil 
servants within government with medical experts outside. This model of health 
policymaking was, with variations, to dominate the process of British 
health-policy formation into the twenty-first century. British government 
carried on a policy-balancing act in which the role of insider/outsider 
organizations and formal interconnections with scientific expertise were 
increasingly important. Third, it emphasized the role of individual behavior, 
legitimated through population-based epidemiology, as the dominant focus of pub-
lic health endeavor in postwar Britain. The report gave public significance 
to a new type of public health and to different scientific ways of studying 
it. The new epidemiology of the 1950s and the new focus on the risk of 
chronic disease were translated into a wider public and policy agenda. 
Fourth, it stimulated new attitudes on the part of government regarding its rela-
tion to the public on matters of health, and a heightened significance for research-
based surveillance. Medicine and consumerism were allied through a focus 
on the role of the individual in society, and through a new emphasis on 
10. James Le Fanu, The Rise and Fall of Modern Medicine (London: Little Brown, 1999); 
Michael Fitzpatrick, “Take Two Aspirins and Thank Your Caring PM,” Times Higher Educ. 
Suppl., 19–26 December 2003, pp. 28–29. See also Fitzpatrick, The Tyranny of Health: Doctors 
and the Regulation of Lifestyle (London: Routledge, 2001).
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individual persuasion. At the same time, research and the social survey 
began to outline a new view of “the public” and to establish a relationship 
between medicine and the social sciences, one that built on the alliances 
within social medicine but also turned them in a new consumerist direc-
tion. It was part of the rise of evidence-based medicine.
The report therefore signified a new style and outlook for public health 
that was emergent at around the same time as the organizational and 
professional changes, but was, in many respects, separate from them. The 
smoking activists were not MOsH or even the new community physicians: 
a new public “public health” was emerging, distinct from the profession 
and its service role. This was research- and “evidence-based,” using the 
social sciences as technical tools. Such developments also invite reflection 
about the nature of the permissiveness of the 1960s and the roots of the 
“health tyranny” that the journalists have criticized. The health discussions 
of the 1960s were marked by contradictory tendencies: in one sense, by 
the very antithesis of permissiveness; in the other, by a new style of “coer-
cive permissiveness” in health. 
The Prehistory of Smoking and Lung Cancer
The early history of the smoking-and-lung-cancer connection is well 
known and has been recounted in a number of different works.11 Con-
cern was roused by the gradual increase in the incidence of cancer; by a 
change in the balance of the sexes, toward men; and by the increasingly 
important role of lung cancer. The greatest increase in lung cancer came 
in males over forty-five, where the incidence increased sixfold between 
1930 and 1945. At first it was thought that these changes might be due to 
improved diagnosis and better recording and registration. Work carried 
out by Sir Ernest Kennaway in the 1930s and published in 1947, a detailed 
examination of postmortem certificates, helped eliminate occupational 
and environmental factors. Kennaway pointed to a connection with ciga-
rette smoking, but his work, based on statistical correlations, carried little 
weight because of the perceived lack of legitimacy of this mode of expla-
nation at the time. Laboratory studies tended to support the connection. 
Research had also been undertaken before the war in Nazi Germany, and 
by the American biometrician Raymond Pearl, for the insurance indus-
11. E.g., Joan Austoker, A History of the Imperial Cancer Research Fund, 1902–1986 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 186–99; Charles Webster, “Tobacco Smoking Addiction: 
A Challenge to the National Health Service,” Brit. J. Addict., 1984, 79 : 8–16.
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try.12 The issue became more urgent after the war, and discussions between 
the Ministry of Health and the Medical Research Council (MRC) led to 
the council’s convening an informal conference on cancer of the lung in 
February 1947. The MRC agreed to initiate a large-scale statistical study of 
the past smoking habits of those with cancer of the lung, and of two con-
trol groups. This was the origin of the work carried out in the Statistical 
Research Unit at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
(LSHTM) by Professor Austin Bradford Hill and Dr. Richard Doll. The 
results, published in the British Medical Journal in 1950, concluded that 
there was a “real association” between carcinoma of the lung and smoking, 
and that smoking was a factor, and an important one, in the production 
of lung cancer.13 Work by Ernest L. Wynder and Evarts A. Graham in the 
United States had come to similar conclusions.14 Later prospective studies 
carried out by Doll and Bradford Hill and by Edward Cuyler Hammond 
and Daniel Horn in the United States appeared to implicate cigarette 
smoking even further.15
Charles Webster has shown in detail how the issue fared over the next 
seven years.16 A written parliamentary answer from Ian Macleod as Con-
servative minister of health in February 1954 accepted that there was a 
connection, but that it was not a simple one.17 When the MRC issued its 
own report on smoking and lung cancer in June 1957, the Ministry of 
Health adopted the argument more fully. The parliamentary secretary to 
the Ministry of Health (MH) for the first time on 27 June 1957 expressed 
unambiguous support for the conclusions reached by Doll and Hill in 
12. George Davey Smith, S. A. Strobele, and Matthias Egger, “Smoking and Health Promo-
tion in Nazi Germany,” J. Epidemiol. & Commun. Health, 1994, 48 : 220–23; Robert N. Proctor, 
The Nazi War on Cancer (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 173–247.
13. Richard Doll and Austin Bradford Hill, “Smoking and Carcinoma of the Lung: Pre-
liminary Report,” Brit. Med. J., 1950, 2 : 739–48.
14. Ernest L. Wynder and Evarts A. Graham, “Tobacco Smoking as a Possible Etiologic 
Factor in Bronchiogenic Carcinoma: A Study of Six Hundred and Eighty-four Proved Cases,” 
JAMA, 1950, 143 (4): 329–36.
15. Richard Doll and Austin Bradford Hill, “The Mortality of Doctors in Relation to 
Their Smoking Habits: A Preliminary Report,” Brit. Med. J., 1954, 1 : 1541–55; Doll and 
Austin Bradford Hill, “Lung Cancer and Other Causes of Death in Relation to Smoking: A 
Second Report on the Mortality of British Doctors,” ibid., 1956, 2 : 1071–81; Edward Cuyler 
Hammond and Daniel Horn, “The Relationship between Human Smoking Habits and Death 
Rates: A Follow- up Study of 187,766 Men,” JAMA, 1954, 155 (15): 1316–27.
16. Webster, “Tobacco Smoking Addiction” (n. 11).
17. Written answer from Ian Macleod, Minister of Health, 12 February 1954, Parliamentary 
Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 523 (1954), cols. 173–74.
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1950. Webster locates this sequence of events in the machinations of the 
powerful and complex advisory machinery that stood between the MRC 
and the MH: the main advisory body was the Cancer and Radiotherapy 
Standing Advisory Committee, reporting to the Central Health Services 
Council, which in turn advised the Ministry of Health. Horace Joules of 
the Central Middlesex Hospital, a member of both bodies, was the only 
person within the advisory-committee machinery consistently to press 
the issue; Paolo Palladino has recently related his stance to a continu-
ing Christian Socialist tradition.18 The initial governmental response 
focused on a Ministry of Health circular encouraging local authorities to 
develop health-education campaigns on smoking. Further action under 
the Labour government of the 1960s saw the banning of cigarette adver-
tisements on television in 1965, and attempts by the Labour minister of 
health, the GP Kenneth Robinson, to introduce legislation to ban cigarette 
coupon schemes and to limit other forms of advertising. Health warnings 
on cigarette packets appeared in 1971. This was the “end of the begin-
ning” of the first phase of the policy response.
The Doll/ Hill research of the 1950s had impacted upon a fluid policy 
situation in that decade in which the governmental response was condi-
tioned by a number of factors, not all of them directly smoking-related.19 
The economic importance of smoking to the exchequer was considerable, 
and the tobacco industry was a valued partner of government, building on 
formal controls that had operated during wartime. But also in play were 
changes in the nature and role of public health; the role of air pollution 
as a contentious political issue; the contested nature of the evidence; the 
central governmental politics of health education; and the general culture 
of smoking, with its electoral implications. The last of these was a crucial 
issue for politicians: did governments have the right to tell the public what 
to do about a culturally sanctioned, acceptable habit that might possibly 
lead to disease many years hence? and, what would this mean in terms of 
political popularity?
It was also a crucial issue for public health. The British social-medicine 
ideology of the 1930s and 1940s had stressed the need for a holistic vision 
of medicine, and key research papers had talked of occupation and of 
class as crucial dynamics. But, as Dorothy Porter’s work has shown, the 
18. Paolo Palladino, “Discourses of Smoking, Health, and the Just Society: Yesterday, 
Today, and the Return of the Same?” Soc. Hist. Med., 2001, 14 : 313–35.
19. This is discussed in Virginia Berridge, “Denial and Delay? Analysing the Policy 
Response to the Smoking and Lung Cancer Connection in the 1950s and 60s,” Hist. J., 
2006, 49 : 1185–209.
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ethos of social medicine was changing in the 1950s, with a new emphasis 
on the role of individual psychology and of issues such as “stress.”20 Social 
medicine was reorienting itself to a focus on chronic-disease epidemiol-
ogy, of which the smoking work formed part, and which laid stress on the 
role of the individual. Central to this reorientation was the classic text by 
the social-medicine pioneer Jerry Morris, Uses of Epidemiology, published 
in 1957.21 Morris’s paper on the impact of exercise on heart disease tell-
ingly compared the rates of heart disease of sedentary bus drivers with 
those of active conductors, combining the occupation and class emphasis 
of 1940s social medicine with the emergent interest in individual behav-
ior.22 Increasingly, too, such interests were looking outside the confines 
of the closed medical world and reaching out to a new engagement with 
“the public,” an activity that previous bans on medical advertising had 
prevented.23 The involvement of Charles Fletcher (who was a pioneer of 
the new media- and public-focused developments) and of Morris in the 
1962 Royal College committee was thus highly significant.
The Origins and Membership  
of the Royal College Committee
Nevertheless, the Royal College of Physicians (RCP) was not the most obvi-
ous body to produce a report on the link between smoking and lung can-
cer, and it had already turned down the opportunity once. In November 
1956, Francis Avery Jones, a gastroenterologist from the Central Middlesex 
Hospital with whom Doll had originally worked, wrote to the president of 
the College, Lord Brain, urging that the College put out a statement on 
the effect of smoking on health, “with particular reference to the rising 
generation.”24 Brain—a shy, reserved man—took a month to reply, only to 
turn the proposal down. The reasons for his refusal were, in their dislike 
of giving public advice, typical of the profession’s attitude at the time:
20. Dorothy Porter, “From Social Structure to Social Behaviour in Britain after the Sec-
ond World War,” in Poor Health: Social Inequality Before and After the Black Report, ed. Virginia 
Berridge and Stuart Blume (London: Cass, 2003), pp. 58–80.
21. Jerry Morris, Uses of Epidemiology (Edinburgh: Livingstone, 1957).
22. J. N. Morris, J. A. Heady, P. A. B. Raffle, C. G. Roberts, and J. W. Parks, “Coronary 
Heart Disease and Physical Activity of Work,” Lancet, 1953, 2 : 1053–57, 1111–20.
23. Kelly Loughlin, “Spectacle and Secrecy: Press Coverage of Conjoined Twins in 1950s 
Britain,” Med. Hist., 2005, 49 : 197–212.
24. Francis Avery Jones to Lord Brain, quoted in Christopher Booth, “Smoking and the 
Gold Headed Cane,” in Balancing Act: Essays to Honour Stephen Lock, ed. Christopher Booth 
(London: Keynes Press, 1991), pp. 49–55, on pp. 51–52.
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The work of Richard Doll and Bradford Hill has received very wide publicity 
and must be known, I should imagine, to every doctor in the country, so it is 
difficult to see that the College could add anything to the knowledge of the 
existing facts. If we go beyond facts, to the question of the giving of advice to 
the public as to what action they should take in the light of the facts, I doubt 
very much whether that should be a function of the College.25
Subsequently, the College’s attitude changed. In 1957 Robert Platt 
was elected president as successor to Brain. Platt had a modernizing 
agenda for the profession, which smoking fitted admirably. He was first 
approached on the subject of smoking by Charles Fletcher, first director 
of the MRC’s pneumoconiosis research unit in Cardiff, who at the time of 
his approach was working as a respiratory physician in the department of 
medicine at Hammersmith Hospital. Fletcher had been invited to lunch 
by the deputy chief medical officer, George Godber, who was frustrated 
by the lack of activity within his Ministry, and the two had agreed to sound 
out Platt about taking on the smoking issue.26 Godber was a member of 
the RCP’s Council and a close friend of Platt. Avery Jones also heard what 
was afoot and wrote again in January 1959 to urge the Royal College to 
action. The first informal meeting was held on 16 February 1959, and 
in April the Comitia of the College agreed that a committee should be 
formed “to report on smoking and atmospheric pollution in relation to 
carcinoma of the lung and other illnesses”; the first formal meeting was 
held at the College on 15 July 1959 at 5 p.m.27
This sequence of events was illustrative of wider changes in postwar 
medicine. Smoking was a chance for the Royal College to position itself 
in relation to new agendas emerging in health. Medical interest had been 
in occupational health and in the environment and disease—symbolized 
by Fletcher’s own previous occupational work on miners’ lung disease 
and his interest in air pollution and chest disease—but these interests 
were giving place to a new focus on chronic diseases of the individual 
brought on by habits like smoking. The networks that operated in this 
instance were also significant for the future: Godber was a graduate of 
the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM), the 
foremost public health school. His position as a medical civil servant in 
25. Ibid.
26. Fletcher continued this “pressure from without” during the course of the committee. 
See his correspondence with Godber on what the Ministry was doing on lung cancer and on 
health education; e.g., Fletcher to Godber, 18 January 1960, NA MH 55/2226.
27. Committee to Report on Smoking and Atmospheric Pollution (hereafter RCP Com-
mittee), Minutes, vol. 1, 1959–63, n.p., Royal College of Physicians Archive, London, U.K.
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the Ministry of Health, but working closely to a health agenda with medi-
cal and health interests outside, was illustrative of the emergence of the 
“policy community”—the term used by political scientists to analyze how 
policymaking interests work, with interests within government forming 
alliances with those outside. These alliances were to become important in 
the making of postwar health policy, particularly in relation to the medi-
cal profession.28 British civil servants are neutral and nonpolitical figures 
who do not change when governments change; the role of the Chief 
Medical Officer in government was as a neutral adviser, and the Ministry 
of Health had a twin-track bureaucratic organization with both special-
ist medical and generalist civil servants.29 The links between the former 
group of civil servants and outside medical interests were important in 
this instance and for other issues in postwar health policymaking. Platt’s 
interests in medical modernization extended widely—he was a leading 
figure behind the subsequent Todd committee on medical education 
in 1968, and was also important in new moves around genetic disease 
in Manchester.30 The creation of the College committee symbolized the 
changing role of medicine.
The membership of the committee was also symbolic. It was decided 
informally through the networks of British social medicine, with Fletcher 
and Platt in leading roles and Godber behind the scenes. Platt was in 
the chair, but Fletcher as its secretary was the moving spirit of its work. 
Fletcher was the son of Walter Morley Fletcher, former secretary of the 
MRC; he had “all the confidence of the Old Etonian” and impeccable 
connections in medical circles, but also a social conscience and a com-
mitment to communicating with the public through the media.31 In 1958 
his series Your Life in Their Hands, showing surgical procedures on televi-
sion, had caused huge controversy. The series had been part of develop-
ments in medical broadcasting. It had originated in a set of programs 
called Thursday Clinic transmitted in 1954 and 1956, consisting of outside 
broadcasts from St. Mary’s hospital in Paddington. The work of NHS hos-
pitals had been seen in earlier programs such as Matters of Life and Death 
28. There is a wide literature on this which is summarized in Virginia Berridge, ed., Mak-
ing Health Policy: Networks in Research and Policy since 1945 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005).
29. Virginia Berridge, “Doctors and the State: The Changing Role of Medical Expertise 
in Policy-making,” Contemp. Brit. Hist., 1997, 11 (4): 66–85.
30. Peter A. Coventry and John V. Pickstone, “From What and Why Did Genetics Emerge 
as a Medical Specialism in the 1970s in the UK? A Case History of Research, Policy and Ser-
vices in the Manchester Region of the NHS,” Soc. Sci. & Med., 1999, 49 : 1227–38.
31. Comment made in interview with Roger Braban, June 1996, London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London.
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(1951) and Matters of Medicine (1952), and medical procedures were also 
shown in The Hurt Mind (1957), which dealt with new developments in 
the treatment of mental illness and in which Fletcher was also involved.32 
Such programs, and the media controversy over cases of conjoined twins 
in the 1950s, had begun the reordering of relationships around medi-
cal confidentiality which had up until then been a constraining issue for 
public depictions of medicine.33 
Fletcher was a leader of these developments—but other members of 
the committee were also closely involved in the new relationships between 
medicine and the media: Dr. Guy Scadding had appeared in Matters of 
Medicine explaining the complexities of the interactions between lung 
cancer, smoking, and air pollution. Jerry Morris, of the MRC-funded 
Social Medicine Unit, had given radio talks, including one in 1955 whose 
content foreshadowed the new developments in public health that the 
RCP committee came to symbolize:
We are dealing with a different social situation. The nineteenth-century epi-
demics, bred in poverty and malnutrition, arose from the failures of the social 
system. . . . But coronary thrombosis . . . with its origins apparently in high 
living standards . . . seems to be arising from what we regard as successes of 
the social system. . . . It is becoming clear that in the modification of personal 
behaviour, of diet, smoking, physical exercise and the rest, which look like 
providing at any rate part of the answer, the responsibility of the individual 
for his own health will be far greater than formerly. It will not be possible to 
impose from without (as drains were built) the new norms of behaviour better 
serving the needs of middle and old age. They will only come about in a new 
kind of partnership between community and individual.34
Morris’s advocacy of media and advertising initiatives on the commit-
tee was strong and a continuing strand in his long career; in 2000 at his 
 ninetieth-birthday conference at LSHTM, the leading epidemiologist 
Michael Marmot remarked that “Jerry has always told me that I should 
watch more television rather than less.”35 Others on the committee, like 
32. Fletcher’s media work is discussed in Kelly Loughlin, “‘Your Life in Their Hands’: 
The Context of a Medical-Media Controversy,” Media Hist., 2000, 6 (2): 177–88.
33. Loughlin, “Spectacle and Secrecy” (n. 23).
34. Jerry Morris, “Twentieth Century Epidemic: Coronary Thrombosis” (transcript of 
BBC Third Programme talk, 1 December 1955), BBC written archives, Caversham, Reading. 
The printed version is “Coronary Thrombosis: A Modern Epidemic,” Listener, 8 December 
1955, pp. 995–96.
35. See Virginia Berridge and Suzanne Taylor, eds., Epidemiology, Social Medicine and Public 
Health, transcript of the witness seminar held on 21 July 2000 on the 90th birthday of Pro-
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Avery Jones, the gastroenterologist who had originally suggested action 
to the RCP, symbolized the new medical interest in smoking and chronic 
disease, while the presence of Sir Aubrey Lewis of the Institute of Psy-
chiatry indicated the role that psychological insights were to play in the 
new developments in public health. The committee subsequently added 
Dr. N. C. Oswald to its number; he was a smoker, and all the rest of the 
committee were by then nonsmokers. The committee also consulted 
experts including Richard Doll and Alexander Haddow of the Chester 
Beatty Institute, and Godber was also available, although not a member 
of the committee. In an interview, Morris remembered that they had tried 
to involve a Medical Officer of Health with an interest in smoking, but 
could not find one.36 That comment was indicative of the gulf between 
academic and practice-based public health. The committee’s membership 
emphasized the networks that were beginning to coalesce around the new 
risk-based public health. It also symbolized an alliance between Fletcher’s 
prestigious medical connections and the clinicians and social-medicine 
people and epidemiologists, who had lower status within the profession.37 
(They had originally been located at the Central Middlesex Hospital in 
Willesden, a North London suburb; as a former local government hospi-
tal under the aegis of the London County Council, this had much lower 
status than the prestigious London teaching hospitals.)
The Work of the Committee
The work of the committee proceeded through nine meetings between 
1959 and 1961, often with long gaps between them. Much was done 
outside the committee, with members preparing papers and gathering 
evidence. Early on it made two key decisions that emphasized the new 
directions in public health. First, it decided to speak directly to the pub-
lic rather than to the profession. The minutes of the fourth meeting, on 
17 March 1960, recorded that a discussion was opened by the president 
on how the report should be presented: “The usual College report had 
limited circulation among the medical profession”; therefore,
fessor Jerry Morris (London: Centre for History in Public Health, 2005), p. 18; available at 
http://www.lshtm.ac.uk/history/jerrymorris.html (last accessed 31 October 2006).
36. Interview with Jerry Morris, June 1995, London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine.
37. Older colleagues at LSHTM remember how it was customary for the epidemiologists 
to wear white coats to show that they were doctors, even though they did not see patients. 
Photographs of Morris from the 1970s show him with a white coat.
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it was agreed that the Committee’s report should have more publicity and a 
wider circulation than the usual College reports. It could not advise govern-
ment on any course of action, but it could suggest lines of action.38
Second, it disposed of the air-pollution connection. Although the Comitia 
of the Royal College had wanted a report that combined discussion of 
both issues, the committee decided not to produce this:
It was agreed that the evidence would be of an entirely different quality and 
nature. It was pointed out that individuals could avoid the dangers of smoking 
but not those of pollution. It was also thought that a section on atmospheric 
pollution within the main report might detract from the main arguments on 
smoking and lung cancer.39
The committee did eventually produce a separate report on air pollu-
tion, but this was not published until the early 1970s and without much 
sense of urgency. The committee recognized that the issue of smoking 
and lung cancer was a much more clear-cut case where individual action 
could be stressed. On both counts, the committee was moving toward a 
concept of health that focused more clearly on individual responsibility 
and that could be expressed through appeals to the public rather than 
to the profession.
The areas of the committee’s work were divided between members 
according to their own interests, so memoranda appeared through the 
meetings on diseases of the lung, on the chemistry and pharmacology of 
smoking, on smoking and the gastrointestinal tract. Interest in consumer 
issues, in advertising and the media, and in what the public thought and 
how it could be influenced formed significant threads in the discussions. 
Early on, Aubrey Lewis produced a paper on the psychological aspects 
of smoking that pointed out the lack of evidence that health education 
could discourage inveterate smokers; school-based prevention might be 
more effective, but there was little information on projects that had been 
undertaken.
Lack of information on these newer strategies and aspects of health 
interest was a theme throughout the work of the committee. Economic 
issues and consideration of the role of the media were to be of growing 
importance within the new ideology of public health—but in the late 
1950s and early 1960s the profession of health economics was still in the 
future, and it was the social-medicine interests that took up the economic 
and media issues. It was the social-medicine pioneer Jerry Morris who was 
38. RCP Committee, Minutes, 17 March 1960.
39. Ibid.
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active throughout the life of the committee in investigating consumer 
expenditure and the role of tobacco advertising. His work showed the 
expanding importance of television advertising in the situation; the com-
mittee therefore pressed for an official survey of smoking habits in chil-
dren and inquired into advertising controls on television.40 Morris also 
brought the issue of coronary heart disease (CHD) into the committee’s 
discussions, influenced by the early publications of the Framingham study 
that had investigated CHD in the United States.41 
Fletcher drew together the final report, making it accessible to the lay 
public, but clearly other members of the committee played an important 
role; Morris’s work was particularly significant for the public, media, and 
consumerist emphasis. It was agreed that the report should include a sec-
tion on the use of advertising against smoking: “modern methods should 
be employed to combat modern methods.”42 Public health at this stage had 
close relationships with the British tobacco industry. Imperial Tobacco, the 
main industry organization, was seen by some public health interests and 
by government as a partner in a shared enterprise to reduce harm from 
smoking.43 Geoffrey Todd, the Imperial Company’s lead statistician, and 
others from the Tobacco Manufacturers Standing Committee provided 
information and statistics for the final report; the report was also shown 
informally to the Tobacco Manufacturers Standing Committee before 
publication.44
The report was finally published in March 1962. Its form, content, 
and presentation were significant. Surveying the history of smoking, the 
chemistry and pharmacology of tobacco smoke, and the latest scientific 
evidence about the relationship with cancer, gastrointestinal diseases, lung 
disease, and coronary heart disease, as well as the psychology of smoking, 
it laid out a possible seven-point agenda for governmental action. Five 
of the seven points were consumerist and media oriented: public educa-
tion, restrictions on sale to children, restriction of tobacco advertising, 
tax increases (and perhaps differential taxation for less harmful pipes and 
cigars), and information on the tar and nicotine content of cigarettes. 
Only two points came from different traditions: the environmentalism 
40. Ibid., 18 February 1960.
41. Ibid., 17 March 1960.
42. Ibid., 4 January 1961.
43. For the history of this relationship, see Virginia Berridge and Penny Starns, “The 
‘Invisible Industrialist’ and Public Health: The Rise and Fall of ‘Safer Smoking’ in the 
1970s,” in Medicine, the Market and the Mass Media, ed. Virginia Berridge and Kelly Loughlin 
(London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 172–91.
44. RCP Committee, Minutes, 23 February 1961.
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of restrictions on smoking in public places, and the “medical model” of 
antismoking clinics.45 The agenda for government thus largely dropped 
action on the environment (air pollution) and gave full rein to the new 
appeal to the public, to economic and consumerist trends.
The 1962 Report and the Appeal to the Public
The manner of the report’s presentation and publication symbolized 
this. The College hired a public relations consultant, Roger Braban, to 
manage the launch of the report, and held its first-ever press conference. 
Braban recalled:
I came in as PR consultant to the RCP a few months before the smoking 
report—they had never used a professional launch . . . then they got a taste for 
it and used it for every report. . . . I spent a lot of time in finding the right team. 
. . . the President and Charles Fletcher, he was a popular figure with the media. 
. . . I timed it so that Ministers had the report before it was published—they 
feel they’re party to something.46
Charles Fletcher later gave a flavor of that first press conference:
On the day before publication a press conference was held at the College and 
it was crowded. Many questions were asked. When one reporter quoted that 
the annual risk of lung cancer in heavy smokers aged 55 was only one in 23, 
the President asked him if he would fly with an airline only one in 23 of whose 
planes crashed he agreed he would not. Next day there was fortunately no big 
news and the report got major headlines, Robert Platt on the BBC and I was 
interviewed on ITV.47
The report was also marked by a special program on Panorama, the 
flagship TV vehicle for current affairs, which went out on television on 
12 March, just after the publication of the report. Fronted by the com-
mentator Richard Dimbleby, the program interviewed scientists (mostly 
laboratory based) and members of the public about their response, and 
about giving up smoking. The centerpiece of the program was an inter-
view by the presenter Robert Kee with John Partridge (chairman of the 
Tobacco Manufacturers Standing Committee) and Sir Robert Platt. The 
standoff between the two, with Platt robustly interrupting Partridge’s 
defense of the industry, made good television:
45. Royal College of Physicians, Smoking and Health (London: Pitman, 1962).
46. Braban interview (n. 31).
47. Charles Fletcher, “The Story of the Reports on Smoking and Health of the Royal 
College of Physicians,” in Ashes to Ashes: The History of Smoking and Health, ed. Stephen Lock, 
Lois Reynolds, and E. M.Tansey (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998), pp. 202–5, on p. 203.
1962 Report of the RCP and the New Public Health 301
KEE: Mr Partridge, would you agree that we must stop young people 
smoking?
PARTRIDGE: No I would not, and let me, just while I can, take up one point 
that Sir Robert made just now. The Observer had no right to make that 
remark in its editorial yesterday, Sir Robert, and nor, with respect, have 
you.
(INTERRUPTION) . . . about only a tobacco manufacturer could deny this.
KEE: Well that is the position we have here now isn’t it?
PARTRIDGE: It is so, but the implication is some dishonest approach to this 
problem, and that is not well founded.
(INTERRUPTION) . . . May I just finish here . . . 48
This was unusual television for the time, but it was a portent of the future 
“mediatization” of health issues and the premium it put on conflict and 
opposition.
The report was popular with the public. Originally the College had 
wanted only 5,000 copies printed, and when Fletcher insisted on double 
that number, it had required the committee to pay for any copies that were 
unsold. But the report sold out within a few days, and a second printing 
was needed. It had sold more than 33,000 copies in the United Kingdom 
by the autumn of 1963, and more than 50,000 in the United States.49 It 
was followed the next year by Fletcher’s “Penguin Special” volume, Com-
mon Sense about Smoking, which symbolically linked the medical evidence 
with a chapter on economic effects and others on social implications and 
how to stop. Here was a further attempt to appeal to the public, which 
brought together what was to become a common combination in public 
health: a review of the science coupled with a self-help guide to individual 
reformation.50
The Work of the Cabinet Committee on Smoking 
What was the government’s response? Governments of the period have 
often been criticized for inadequate responses, reliant on health educa-
tion rather than more stringent measures of control. But the choice of 
health education as the main response, and the change in the nature of 
that education, was significant. Just as medicine in this period was reori-
enting toward a public advice role, so too can we see governments of both 
48. There is a transcript of the program in the Ministry of Health papers; see Public 
Health Propaganda: Smoking and Lung Cancer, Publicity Policy, 1961–, NA MH 55/2204.
49. Fletcher, “Story of the Reports” (n. 47); RCP Committee, Minutes, 6 December 
1961.
50. Charles Fletcher, Common Sense about Smoking (London: Penguin Books, 1963).
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political persuasions, Labour and Conservative, moving toward a new view 
of their role in relation to the population and health matters, in line with 
the changed profile of disease. Governments began to assume a new duty 
to advise and warn about health risk, to persuade their citizens rather than 
to assume that a sense of public duty inherent in the population would 
lead them to make up their own minds. Politicians remained concerned 
about the electoral implications of such a stance—but their opposition to 
intervention in such matters was in decline by the end of the 1960s.
Governments began to seek to influence the health habits of those 
whom they governed. To do this, they also began actively to seek out 
information about them—about the beliefs and habits of normal popu-
lations, and about their health—through surveys and other research 
mechanisms, a development that paralleled the increased emphasis on 
populations within chronic-disease epidemiology. This was an important 
change that again built on the wartime social surveys and gave a new role 
to research and also to quantitative social science.51 The social science 
disciplines assumed heightened technocratic significance in relation to 
these developments. The 1962 report was an important catalyst for the 
“evidence-based” tendency within the new public health.
Let us look at how these responses developed in the 1960s. The main 
vehicle for governmental response to the report was the cabinet com-
mittee on smoking, which reported to the main cabinet. Cabinet com-
mittees had been briefly formed in the 1950s at the time of the various 
parliamentary statements, and had been chaired by the home secretary 
of the day. R. A. Butler, as home secretary, chaired the first meeting of the 
latest committee; but Harold Macmillan, the prime minister, did not want 
Butler in this role and Lord Hailsham, lord president of the Council, took 
over. The ministerial committee was paralleled by one of officials, which 
did the detailed work.52 The officials moved swiftly: the first meeting of 
their committee was on 23 March, two further meetings followed, and a 
draft report was ready to go to the lord president by the middle of April.53 
The report, preceded by a flurry of activity in the relevant departments, 
was relatively anodyne, placing its reliance on health education and on 
voluntary agreements for advertising. The officials came down against 
51. For the earlier history of surveys, see Martin Bulmer, K. Bales, and K. K. Sklar, eds., 
The Social Survey in Historical Perspective, 1880–1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991). 
52. P. W. Cary, the civil servant who chaired this committee, was reluctant to reveal its 
existence: see note from him to the other officials on the committee, 27 April 1962, NA 
CAB 21/4648.
53. Minutes of third meeting, 13 April 1962, NA CAB 130/185 GEN 763.
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differential taxation (taxation graded according to the harm occasioned 
by the product—so that pipes and cigars, thought to be less harmful, 
would attract lower tax rates than those for cigarettes) and the taxation 
option in general: taxation, it was argued, would penalize the poor, raise 
the cost of living, and have a serious effect on producer economies in 
the empire such as Rhodesia. This view reflected the belief that more-
restrictive action could not be sustained without major change in public 
attitudes to smoking. Research in Edinburgh and the government’s own 
pilot survey of public attitudes to smoking through the Central Office of 
Information (COI) had confirmed that most people knew about the link 
between smoking and lung cancer, but their views on why smoking was 
harmful to health were different from those of the scientists: the public 
view of smoking stressed the environmental-nuisance aspects rather than 
the risk-based epidemiology.54
The politicians did not agree on the sales-to-children issue, nor on 
differential taxation. The Treasury fought strongly against the latter, 
and ultimately the committee could not agree. In the event, education 
and voluntarism were the keynotes of the response, and the committee 
decided not to make a statement. As Hailsham told Macmillan, a small 
publicity campaign would not be welcomed, and in any case interest had 
abated for the present. He proposed to set up the machinery and start 
the campaign, perhaps issuing a statement later on. A meeting with the 
manufacturers might also result in an agreement to apply the TV restric-
tions voluntarily to other advertising, so the government could then claim 
credit for that also.55 At a subsequent meeting in the House of Lords with 
representatives of the Tobacco Advisory Committee (TAC), the main 
industry representative organization, the lord president said that the gov-
ernment accepted the scientific case as in the RCP report but was against 
compulsion and action that would lead to pressure for similar measures 
in respect to alcohol, and even to foods like chocolate; it was “not the 
government’s purpose to induce any catastrophic change in smoking 
habits.”56 The meeting resulted in a move toward overall agreement on 
advertising restrictions based on the code applicable to television. On 
14 November, Hailsham wrote to Sir Alexander Maxwell, chairman of the 
TAC and previously wartime Tobacco Controller, that he felt the informal 
54. For discussion of this point, see Public Health Propaganda: Smoking and Lung Can-
cer, Publicity Policy, 1957–60, NA MH 55/2203.
55. Lord President to Prime Minister, 25 July 1962, NA CAB 21/4878.
56. Notes of a meeting with representatives of the TAC (Tobacco Advisory Committee), 
31 July 1962, NA CAB 21/4878.
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way this matter had been dealt with was suited to other issues as they arose. 
But he was clear that he was no stooge for industry interests; someone at 
Carreras had sent him a box of filter-tipped Piccadilly cigarettes: “This 
was indeed bearding the lion in his den, but it was as ineffectual as the 
devil’s attempt on St. Anthony.”57
The governmental response was thus muted and focused on the strat-
egy of health education. The multiplicity of interests in government was 
a key factor. The Treasury view ultimately prevailed over the taxation 
issue, but not before the implications had been fully aired at the political 
level. The role of the industry was important, although its representatives 
were called in after the political decisions had been taken. Also behind 
these decisions was a desire to achieve a balance in policy, and the real-
ization that without a huge change in the social positioning of smoking 
there was little point in initiating a major program of activity. Discussion 
of health-education strategies and organization was not the only way in 
which government considered the implications of the RCP report: the 
debates about differential taxation and other strategies also led to impor-
tant developments both in smoking policy and in public health later on, 
in the 1970s.58
But health education was the main response. We can trace the begin-
nings of the important change in attitude from the 1950s. It was one that 
also ultimately saw the responsibility for health education move from the 
local arena to become a national concern. In the late 1950s, at the time of 
the MRC’s statement on smoking and lung cancer, the response had been 
at the local level through the Medical Officer of Health. The message that 
came across in public education in the 1950s was equivocal. The idea of 
outlining specific courses of action was anathema to a society that associ-
ated “propaganda” with wartime central direction, and with earlier Nazi 
propaganda. Health education at this time placed its faith in the citizen-
ship of its recipients. One can see the government departments edging 
toward this change in the discussion of smoking, prodded also by tensions 
in the organization and funding of health education. The civil servant 
Enid Russell Smith, always an incisive analyst of events, commented in 
1962 that government could draw in future on two things: parents’ con-
cern for their children, and the changes taking place in the medical pro-
fession. Publicity would have the authority of the profession. So far, she 
57. Lord Hailsham to Sir Alexander Maxwell of the Tobacco Advisory Committee, 14 
November 1962, NA CAB 21/4878.
58. For discussion of how the differential taxation question evolved, see Berridge and 
Starns, “‘Invisible Industrialist’” (n. 43).
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commented, the state had not sought to protect individuals from doing 
harm to their own health if they were not harming the health of others; 
alcohol was an exception to the rule, and also drugs of addiction, but for 
both it was the social consequences rather than individual health that was 
paramount. The new line might be that the costs fell on the state, and so 
government should stop people from damaging their health—but, she 
commented presciently, once government took on this role, it would not 
stop at smoking.59 Lung cancer, argued the secretary of state for Scotland, 
the minister of education, and the minister of health, in an appendix to 
a policy document prepared just before the 1962 report was published, 
was a largely preventable disease, but “the question for us is whether it is 
our duty as a Government to set about preventing it.”60
This was the central issue. The period encompassing the end of the 
1950s and the beginning of the 1960s was suffused with discussion within 
government about a reorientation of its role in relation to the health of 
the public. Although the costs of the newly established NHS were a mat-
ter of concern elsewhere in the policy machine, there was no connection 
between that issue and the potential expansion of the role of government 
in relation to behavior. Here government was actively resisting its potential 
new role. It was feared, for example, that more cancer education would 
lead to greater fear of cancer and hence a greater demand for services, 
not a reduction. The discussion of the rise in lung cancer was affected 
by those considerations. The NHS, in any case, was recognized already 
to be a national sickness service rather than a national health service, con-
centrating on disease rather than on positive health. It was not until the 
1973 oil crisis that costs and the role of individual behavior began to be 
considered in tandem. The 1962 report—produced by an “outside” body, 
not by an official committee—brought to a head the issue of whether 
government should have a role in health behavior, and also highlighted 
the organizational tensions. It led ultimately, through the Cohen com-
mittee report of 1964, to the formation in 1968 of the Health Education 
Council, a new technocratic central agency responsible for persuasive 
media campaigns.61
59. Minute from Enid Russell Smith, 5 February 1962, NA MH 55/2204.
60. Smoking and Health: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment, 2 March 1962, Annex A 26, February 1962, Memorandum by the Secretary of State 
for Scotland, the Minister of Education and the Minister of Health, NA CAB 129/108 
C(62)43.
61. These developments are discussed in more depth in Virginia Berridge and Kelly 
Loughlin, “Smoking and the New Health Education in Britain, 1950s to 1970s,” Amer. J. 
Pub. Health, 2005, 95 : 956–64.
306 virginia berridge
The Control of Advertising
Advertising for health was part of the emergent media and consumerist 
focus of public health—but advertising was also an activity to be opposed 
when it was promoting harmful products. The same combination of 
economics and statistical evidence began to mark governmental activ-
ity against tobacco advertising, the other key plank of the government’s 
response to the RCP report. This new consumer strand in policy was sym-
bolized by another report, which arrived in the Ministry of Health just 
after the publication of the RCP’s, from the Advertising Inquiry Council, 
a body formed in March 1959 in order to represent the interests of the 
consumer in advertising.62 It was a study of expenditure and trends in 
sales advertising on tobacco, researched and written by an economist 
and a doctor—a significant combination for the future of public health. 
It looked at the rise in expenditure on tobacco advertising in the early 
1960s: advertising costs had risen by 50 percent in one year, 1960, and 
the public’s expenditure on tobacco was also rising. Women’s smoking 
was on the increase, and the teenage market was growing. Filter cigarettes 
had taken off in popularity in the mid-1950s after their introduction in 
the late 1940s to save leaf and to save smokers’ money after increases in 
tobacco duty; the report noted that their sales now accounted for 20 per-
cent of the cigarette market. The whole nature of tobacco and cigarette 
promotion had changed in recent years. The Council’s report, which 
was mentioned in Parliament, added to fears already raised about trends 
within the tobacco industry: a Monopolies Commission report had drawn 
attention to its high degree of business concentration, with two firms, 
Imperial and Gallaher, accounting for over 90 percent of the market. 
Philip Noel Baker, MP, chairman of the Advertising Inquiry Council, was 
pressing Macmillan for an advertising ban.63 Fletcher and Morris were 
also involved.64 Advertising was an important component of the response 
to the 1962 report, and the tobacco companies voluntarily offered the 
removal of all advertising on television before 9 p.m. But concerns later 
arose on their part about this voluntary concession. Partridge of Imperial 
62. The report was widely circulated within government. See Tobacco Smoking and 
Health: Restrictions on Advertising, 1962–65, NA CAB 124/1672.
63. Philip Noel Baker, MP, to Harold Macmillan, 29 May 1962, NA CAB 21/4878, 
1962–63.
64. Ministry of Health, Note of a meeting with the Advertising Inquiry Council to discuss 
cigarette advertising, July 1963, Smoking and Health 16/2/3 part 4.24, NA CAB 21/5083, 
1963–64. Fletcher and Morris were present at the meeting along with Noel Baker and repre-
sentatives from the Baptist Union, the Methodists, and others. The Advertising Inquiry Coun-
cil also met with the TAC on 13 May 1963 and agreed to differ about advertising control.
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told a Board of Trade official in June 1962 that Imperial and Gallahers 
had seen advantages in the concession: they had expected to be able to 
reduce advertising expenditure by 50 percent because of the television 
restriction—but Rothman Carreras had increased its advertising, and so 
the manufacturers were beginning to break ranks.65 Negotiations about 
further restrictions dragged on into the 1964 changeover to a Labour 
government—which took a stronger line.
The Social Survey, Social Research,  
and the New Role of the Public
What was also beginning to change in the mid-1960s was the view of “the 
public” held by politicians and by officials: this was to be a crucial com-
ponent of future public health initiatives. The commercial techniques 
of market research expanded in the postwar years and government also 
began to survey the nature of public opinion and attitudes through the 
social survey. This surveillance of the population was part of a more gen-
eral expansion of research and evaluation that was epitomized by the 
smoking issue. In 1962 a report from the PR firm Armstrong Warden, 
presented to the Ministry of Health’s advisory group on publicity, had 
pointed out the long-term nature of trying to change public attitudes to 
smoking. The first job was to convince people that smoking did constitute 
a danger, and the effects of that should be measured by public opinion 
research.66 As with the change of attitude toward the content of public 
education, government was edging toward this form of surveillance. A 
pilot social survey had been carried out in 1960 for the Home Affairs com-
mittee by the Social Survey division of the Central Office of Information. 
This had confirmed the impression given by earlier surveys carried out 
in Edinburgh to evaluate a campaign led by the MOH there in the 1950s: 
most of the population was aware of the association between smoking 
and lung cancer; only one person in the 1960 survey was not, an old lady 
of eighty-seven who was a nonsmoker. But both the Edinburgh and the 
pilot surveys had shown that a smaller proportion of the survey popula-
tion accepted that the association was proved, and a negligible number 
had given up smoking because of it.67
65. G. J. MacMahon of the Board of Trade to Fife Clark of the COI, 15 June 1962, NA 
CAB 21/4878, 1962–63.
66. “The Role of Publicity in the Smoking and Health Campaign,” April 1962, Report 
for the COI by Armstrong Warden Ltd., NA MH 55/2237.
67. Ann Cartwright, Fred M. Martin and J. G. Thomson, “Health Hazards of Cigarette 
Smoking: Current Popular Beliefs,” Brit. J. Prevent. & Soc. Med., 1960, 14 : 160–66; Cart-
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In the mid-1960s the surveillance of public attitudes went further. For 
the first time, survey research and evaluation accompanied a campaign 
almost from the start, and research into young people’s attitudes to smok-
ing was undertaken. There was also research into medical students’ atti-
tudes. The research was carried out by Drs. Aubrey McKennell and R. K. 
Thomas of the Social Survey division and by the social psychologist John 
Bynner. Bynner’s work on adolescent smoking was based on the smoking 
questions in a wartime survey of adolescent sexual behavior by the Cen-
tral Council for Health Education.68 The results of the McKennell survey, 
started in 1963 and first reported to the officials’ committee in 1964 when 
the American surgeon general’s report was under consideration, empha-
sized the potential new role for government health education: “The ethics 
or appropriateness of using such an approach in Government publicity 
needs to be faced. The use of somewhat devious, emotional rather than 
straightforward means of persuasion is of course, for better or worse, a 
characteristic of much successful commercial advertising.”69
Other survey research was carried out by social scientists and epidemi-
ologists, and increasingly this focused on the young. The sociologist Mar-
got Jefferys was involved in the 1950s and early 1960s in a study of Harlow 
New Town with other researchers from the London School of Hygiene; 
her study of the impact of health education on children’s attitudes toward 
smoking was one of the first academic publications in the field.70 The 
choice of smoking and of children also indicated the reorientation of 
this type of “community study,” which had until then concentrated on 
the environment rather than individual issues. Jefferys, as a key figure in 
the Society for Social Medicine in this period, was part too of the trans-
formation of social medicine into a new form of public health that the 
smoking work symbolized.71 In the discussions of the ongoing research 
wright, Martin and Thomson, “Distribution and Development of Smoking Habits,” Lancet, 
1959, 2 : 725–27.
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in the Central Office of Information and the Ministry of Health can be 
seen in embryo the emergent evaluative paradigm of “relevant research,” 
a precursor of later evidence-based tendencies in health research.72
The Electoral Argument Diminishes
The publication of the American surgeon general’s report in 1964 led to 
a further officials’ report and to political interest. The American report 
extended associations between smoking and health risk to diseases other 
than lung cancer, but British officials did not feel that this warranted 
further action. On 30 June 1964 the cabinet committee approved the 
officials’ suggestion of a modest extension of the government’s health-
education campaign. There was no support for a ban on TV advertising 
or on smoking in cinemas. Least opposition was attracted by packet warn-
ings. Lord Hailsham wanted more action. On 6 April 1964, he wrote in 
response to his officials’ lack of enthusiasm: “I consider that the American 
Report, the American action and the Social Survey have strengthened the 
case for action, and that it is not too early to say that our limited campaign 
is failing and that unless we can bare our teeth nothing that we do will be 
taken seriously.”73 He also inserted a significant change in the inequality 
argument deployed by officials: the words “it would bear more hardly 
on the poor than on the rich” were replaced by “it could be harder for 
a poor man than for a rich man to continue his existing level of smok-
ing and while this element of discrimination might be said to be more 
to the poor man’s benefit, it would be unlikely to go uncriticised.”74 But 
Hailsham’s response in 1964 was unusual for the time. As he pointed out 
in the Commons adjournment debate on the surgeon general’s report, he 
was a nonsmoker in a Parliament of smokers, a cabinet of smokers, and 
an electorate of smokers. His views did not at that stage represent either 
the cultural or the political norm.75
In 1961, Enoch Powell, the Conservative minister of health when 
the RCP report was published, had expressed his opposition to media 
72. The connection with smoking and research is not noted in Jeanne Daly, Evidence 
Based Medicine and the Search for a Science of Clinical Care (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2005), in her discussion of the lineages of evidence-based medicine (pp. 128–53), 
although the connection between social medicine and the rise of health-services research 
in Britain is made.
73. Note from Lord Hailsham, 6 April 1964, NA CAB 21/5083.
74. Ibid.
75. Adjournment debate speech by Lord Hailsham, 12 February 1964, Parliamentary 
Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 630, col. 522.
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 strategies.76 In an interview conducted in 1975, Powell was more forth-
coming about the roots of his opposition. Governments did not like to 
reorganize taxation, and then there was the question of harm, which, in 
the case of smoking, was fluid and vague. Legislating against a widespread 
and common form of behavior was very different from legislating against 
an uncommon and marginal form. Governments would be very foolish 
to act without overwhelming evidence—and here the 1962 report, in his 
view, did make a difference to the clarity of the issue.77
Kenneth Robinson, as Labour minister of health in the mid- to late 
1960s, was more active against smoking, but his view of policy was also 
that it was constrained by public opinion, not by financial considerations. 
He also stressed that the main constraint on government had been that 
there was no public support for action against smoking. The answer, as 
he saw it, was to change the climate of opinion through health education, 
in particular with themes like smell and attractiveness that appealed to 
young people.78 The Labour politician Richard Crossman’s opposition 
to Robinson’s proposed changes in smoking policy in the later 1960s was 
also prompted by electoral considerations.79 But this argument began 
to change in the 1970s when Conservative politicians like Keith Joseph 
and Labour politicians like David Owen and Dennis Healey as chancel-
lor of the exchequer saw dawning electoral advantage in antismoking 
measures.
Conclusion
The RCP report of 1962 was the forerunner of later College reports on 
smoking and a host of other health-related subjects, all of which were 
aimed at both government and the public. The “medical voice” developed 
important relationships with both government and the public in areas that 
would not previously have been considered the province of either. In the 
1970s this insider/outsider relationship for medicine developed further 
into a host of expert committees with close relationships within govern-
ment. The RCP report in 1962 was a significant stage in moves toward a 
new era in which the presentation of science to the public through the 
76. Minute from Enoch Powell, 11 November 1961, NA MH 55/2227.
77. Interview with Enoch Powell, October 1975, William Norman Papers, ASH (Action 
on Smoking and Health) archive, SA/ASH R.27, box 79, Wellcome Library, London.
78. Interview with Kenneth Robinson, 18 January 1976, ibid., SA/ASH R.31 box 79. 
79. R. Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, vol. 3, Secretary of State for Social Services 
1968–1970 (London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, 1977), entry for 19 July 1968, 
p. 147.
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media, with the authority of scientists and the medical profession, became 
central. As consumerist trends in society consolidated, and medicine and 
public health both sought “modernization,” the old tradition of “giving 
the facts” to citizens was transformed into warnings about health risk. The 
nature of public opinion and “the public” was exposed to research-based 
surveillance. The techniques of social as well as medical science were 
brought into play. These changes were recognizably rooted in some of the 
postwar transformations of social medicine, but they also incorporated 
new commercial techniques of persuasion and commercial ideas about 
research. The permissive-society analysts have argued for a diminished 
state role for some health-related issues—but the case of smoking, and the 
new ideas within public health, show the influence of the state as increas-
ing, not diminishing. This influence was exerted through new relation-
ships with the medical profession and with research, and through new 
agencies. Government and the medical profession began to share a belief 
in the power of the media and of advertising to alter public attitudes.80 
This is what I have called “coercive permissiveness”: members of the pub-
lic could modify their own habits and lifestyle to gain better health, but 
increasingly that modification was state ordained and supported. The case 
of smoking and the RCP report shows how such ideas and interests were 
beginning to shape a distinctive postwar British public health ideology, 
separate from the organizational base of the profession in health services 
and community medicine that has attracted most commentary. The report 
mediated between social medicine in flux and the new evidence-based 
medicine and public health.
Virginia Berridge is Professor of History at the London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine, University of London, Keppel Street, London WC1E 
7HT, U.K. (e-mail: virginia.berridge@lshtm.ac.uk). She is head of the Centre 
for History in Public Health. Her research interests include substance use and 
policy, HIV/AIDS, public health, and the relationship between evidence and 
policy. Her recent publications include Making Health Policy: Networks in Research 
and Policy after 1945 (editor and author) and Medicine, the Market and the Mass 
Media: Producing Health in the Twentieth Century, both published in 2005. Her 
book on postwar public health will be published in 2007.
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